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Despite  the  heightened  competition  and  con- 
tinuing  adjustments  resulting  from  the  first  full year 
of regional  interstate  banking,  Fifth  Federal  Reserve 
District’  commercial  banks  produced  during  1986 
the  highest  return  on  assets  and  return  on  equity  of 
the  past  ten  years.  On  average,  Fifth  District  banks’ 
earnings  reached  $1  for  every  $100  in  assets  and 
$15.87  for every  $100  of equity.  The  increased  prof- 
itability  was a stark  contrast  to the  decline  to 63 cents 
for  each  $100  of  assets  and  $10.22  for  each  $100 
of equity  experienced  by  the  average  of all banks  in 
the  United  States. 
A closer  look  at the  numbers,  however,  reveals  that 
the  rise  in  return  on  assets  was  due  to  gains  from 
the  sale  of  securities,  gains  that  were  the  result  of 
falling  interest  rates.  When  securities  gains  are 
excluded,  Fifth  District  return  on  assets  actually 
declined  from  1985.  Since  banks  nationwide  also 
benefited  from  securities  gains,  excluding  such  gains 
makes  their  decline  in return  on assets  even  greater. 
Thus,  while gains on securities  sales help  explain  why 
Fifth  District  profitability  improved,  they  do little  to 
explain  the  continuing  difference  between  Fifth 
District  profitability  and that  of the  average  of all U.S. 
banks. 
As interest  rates  fell  during  1986,  District  banks’ 
net  interest  margin  declined  significantly.  The  decline 
was largely offset  by lower  provision  for loan and lease 
losses  and  noninterest  expenses.  U.S.  banks  on 
average  also  had  a decrease  in net  interest  margin, 
but  had higher  provision  for loan and lease  losses  and 
noninterest  expenses  as  well. 
William  Whelpley, formerly of the  Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond,  provided  yeoman’s  service in the  construction  of the 
data  base  for  this  article.  Frank  Fry,  Board  of Governors  of the 
Federal  Reserve  System,  supplied  helpful  advice  for  retrieving 
the  data. 
1 Maryland,  the  District  of Columbia,  Virginia,  North  Carolina, 
South  Carolina,  and  most  of West  Virginia.  At the  end  of  1986, 
there  were  605  commercial  banks  in the  Fifth  District.  During 
1986,  25  new  banks  were  established  while  21  were  mereed 
into  other  banks  for  a  net  gain  of  four  from  1985.  No  FTfth 
District  commercial  banks  failed  in  1986. 
Fifth  District  banks  allowed  their  capital  ratios  to 
decline  during  1986 so that  at the  end  of  1986 capital 
adequacy  was  diminished  somewhat.  In  contrast, 
U.S.  banks  reported  increased  capital  ratios  on 
average. 
All ratios  and  figures  in  this  article  are  based  on 
book  values  of liabilities  and  assets.  When  interest 
rates  vary  or  the  economic  health  of  borrowers 
declines,  book  values  do not  automatically  reflect  the 
changes.  While  book  values  are  probably  the  best 
measures  available  to  the  public  at  this  time,  it  is 
important  to be aware of their  limitations.  The  limita- 
tions  are  discussed  in the  box  beginning  on page  32 
of  this  article. 
Profits 
Rettm  01z  Asets  Net  income  grew  by  almost  19 
percent  at Fifth  District  banks  from  1985  to  1986. 
Table  I  shows  that  return  on  assets  (ROA)  in- 
creased  from  .98  percent  in  1985  to  1.00  percent 
in  1986.2  For  all U.S  banks,  net  income  fell by  1.2 
percent,  leading  to  a decline  in ROA  from  .70  per- 
cent  in 1985  to  .63 percent  in  1986  (see  Appendix). 
About  8  percent  of  Fifth  District  banks  reported 
losses  in  1986,  while  almost  20  percent  of all U.S. 
banks  reported  losses  for the  same  period.  While  the 
average  return  on assets  and return  on equity  (ROE) 
for Fifth  District  banks  reached  historically  high levels 
for  the  year,  the  average  figures  for  all U.S.  banks 
fell to their  lowest  levels  during  the  period  recorded 
in  the  Appendix  table. 
The  improvement  in gains  on  securities  relative 
to average  assets  from  1985  to  1986  figured  impor- 
tantly  in the  improved  profitability  of Fifth  District 
banks.  Gains  or losses  on securities  are realized  when 
banks  sell securities  at prices  different  from  their  book 
values.  Since  interest  rates  fell during  most  of  1986, 
selling  securities  produced  gains.  Because  securities 
gains  and  losses  are  considered  to  arise  from  factors 
largely  outside  the  control  of management,  however, 
they  are often  excluded  from  ROA.  Excluding  them 
z  See  the  definition  and  discussion  of return  on assets  and  return 
on  equity  in  the  box  on  page  32. 
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INCOME  AND  EXPENSE  AS A PERCENT  OF AVERAGE ASSETS 
FIFTH  DISTRICT  COMMERCIAL  BANKS,  1979-86 
Item  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
Gross  interest  revenue  8.49  9.46  11.15  10.86  9.58  10.02 
Gross  interest  expense  4.53  5.60  7.29  6.93  5.82  6.33 
Net  interest  margin  3.96  3.86  3.86  3.93  3.76  3.69 
Noninterest  income  0.80  0.90  1.01  1.03  1.16  1.15 
Loan  and  lease  loss  provision  0.26  0.26  0.25  0.28  0.25  0.33 
Securities  gains*  -  0.02 
Noninterest  expense  3.24  3.37  3.48  3.53  3.45  3.37 
Income  before  tax  1.26  1.13  1.14  1.15  1.22  1.12 
Taxes  0.28  0.20  0.19  0.18  0.22  0.19 
OtheP  -0.04  -  0.04  -  0.09  -0.10  -0.02  0.00 
Return  on  assets?  0.94  0.89  0.86  0.87  0.98  0.93 
Cash  dividends  declared  0.30  0.32  0.33  0.37  0.34  0.31 
Net  retained  earnings  0.64  0.57  0.53  0.50  0.64  0.62 
Return  on  equity5 




























15.87  13.51  12.79  12.56  13.12  15.21  14.62 
80,671  88,280  97,217  108,439  121,173  137,131  156,574  181,133 
Note:  Discrepancies  due  to  rounding  error. 
1  Average  assets  are  based  on fully  consolidated  volumes  outstanding  at  the  beginning  and  at  the  end  of the  year. 
2  Banks  were  required  to  report  securities  gains  or losses above  the  tax  line  on their  income  statements  for the  first  time  in  1984. 
B  Includes  securities  and extraordinary  gains or losses after  taxes,  for  1979-83  data,  and  extraordinary  items  and other  adjustments  after 
taxes  for  1984-86  data. 
4  Return  on assets  is net  income  divided  by average  assets. 
5  Return  on  equity  is net  income  divided  by average  equity.  Average  equity  is based  on fully  consolidated  volumes  outstanding  at  the 
beginning  and  it  the  end  of the  year. 
Source:  Consolidated  Reports  of  Condition  and  Income. 
changes  the  picture  for the  Fifth  District  (Table  II). 
Rather  than  increasing,  ROA  net  of securities  gains 
and  losses  fell in the  Fifth  District  from  .92  in  1985 
to  25  in  1986.  For  all U.S.  banks,  the  measure  fell 
from  .64  in  1985  to  .50  in  1986.  Note  that  while 
excluding  securities  gains  affects  the  comparison  be- 
tween  performance  in  1985  and  in  1986,  it does  not 
affect  the  comparison  between  Fifth  District  banks 
and  their  peers  nationwide. 
Chart  1 shows  ROAs  (including  securities  gains) 
for  three  size  classes  of  Fifth  District  banks.  Only 
large  banks  (more  than  $750  million  in  1986  total 
assets)  improved  their  ROAs  in  1986.  Large  banks’ 
ROAs  averaged  .97  percent  in 1986  compared  with 
.92  percent  in  1985.  ROA  declined  to  1.10  percent 
for  medium  Fifth  District  banks  (1986  total  assets 
between  $100  million  and  $750  million)  and to  1.17 
percent  at small banks  (less than  $100  million  in total 
assets).  Table  II shows  that  excluding  securities  gains 
from  ROA  leads  to decreases  for all the  size  classes. 
Large  banks’  ROA  less  securities  gains  fell from  .85 
in 1985  to  .79 in  1986,  while  that  for medium  banks 
1985  1986 
fell from  1.13  to  1.03  and  that  for  small  banks  from 
1.19  to  1.09. 
There  were  several  other  factors  influencing  the 
changes  in ROA  for the  three  size classes  in the  Fifth 
District.  Net  interest  margins  declined  as a percent 
of average  assets  for all three.  For  large  banks,  lower 
loan  and  lease  loss  provisions  added  to  ROA,  while 
lower  noninterest  expenses  did  so for medium-sized 
banks.  For  small  banks,  higher  loan  and  lease  loss 
provisions  and  lower  noninterest  revenue  helped 
move  ROA  down  from  the  preceding  year. 
Comparing  Chart  2 with  Chart  1 reveals  a strik- 
ing  difference  between  the  performance  of  small 
banks  nationwide  and  those  in  the  Fifth  District. 
While  Fifth  District  small  bank  ROA  has  remained 
high  throughout  the  years  shown,  U.S.  small  banks’ 
average  ROA  ,began  falling  in  1981  and  has 
dropped  each  year  since  then.  The  decline  in prof- 
itability  outside  the  Fifth  District  is largely  due  to 
smaller  banks’  exposure  to  geographically  limited 
problems  such  as  those  in  agriculture  and  the  oil 
industry. 
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PROFITABILITY  MEASURES  BEFORE  AND  AFTER 
ADJUSTMENT  FOR SECURITIES  GAINS  AND  LOSSES 
FIFTH  DISTRICT  COMMERCIAL  BANKS 
ROA 
ROE 
/  Sec.  gains/losses 
Adjusted  ROA 
Adjusted  ROE 
Book  value  leverage 
ROA  1.23  1.14  0.92  0.98 
ROE  13.53  14.99  15.95  15.41 
Sec.  gains/losses  0.04  0.01  0.07  0.06 
Adjusted  ROA  1.19  1.13  0.85  0.92 
Adjusted  ROE  13.08  14.87  14.74  14.50 
Book  value  leverage  10.98  13.11  17.42  15.68 
1986 
Small  Medium  Large  Total 
1.17  1.10  0.97  1.00 
12.59  14.01  16.99  15.87 
0.08  0.07  0.18  0.15 
1.09  1.03  0.79  0.85 
11.68  13.06  13.88  13.44 
10.80  12.69  17.57  15.80 
1985 
Note:  Adjusted  ROA  (ROE)  is net  income  less  securities  gains  and 
losses  divided  by  average  assets  (equity).  Leverage  is average 
assets  divided  by  average  equity.  Discrepancies  are  due  to 
rounding  error. 
Looked  at differently,  in  1981  about  5 percent  of 
all small  U.S.  banks  had  negative  ROAs,  while  by 
1986  more  than  2 1 percent  had  moved  into  the  loss 
column.  In  the  Fifth  District,  in  contrast,  about 
Chart  1 
RETURN  ON  ASSETS* 
Percent  Fifth  District  Banks 
Medium  Banks 
1979  1983 
*  Net  income  divided  by  average  assets. 
1985 
Chat-l  2 
RETURN  ON  ASSETS’ 
Percent  All  U.S.  Banks 
0.8  - 
I 
- 
I  1  I  1  I  I 
1979  1981  1983  1985 
*  Net  income  divided  by  average  assets. 
6 percent  of  small  banks  had  ROAs  below  zero  in 
198 1, but  this  had  risen  to just  10 percent  by  1986. 
At the  other  end  of the  profitability  spectrum,  in 1981 
approximately  60  percent  of  small  U.S.  banks  had 
ROAs  greater  than  1.0  percent.  But  by  1986  only 
about  35  percent  of  small  banks  could  make  this 
claim.  In  the  Fifth  District,  less  than  50  percent  of 
small  banks  had  ROAs  over  1 percent  in  198 1, but 
this  rose  to  54  percent  by  1986. 
Retzln on Eq.&y  Fifth  District  banks  as a group 
increased  average  ROE  from  15.4 1 percent  in 1985 
to  15.87  percent  in  1986  (Table  II).  The  increase 
reflected  both  higher  ROA  and  increased  leverage3 
at  large  banks.  Chart  3  shows,  however,  that  the 
average  ROE  performance  conceals  the  performance 
of  small-  and  medium-sized  banks.  Excluding 
securities  gains as in Table  II would  lead to a decline 
in ROE  for  all three  size  classes  and  for the  average 
of  the  District. 
On  average,  U.S.  banks  experienced  a decline  in 
ROE  from  11.33  percent  to  10.22  percent  during 
1986.  Since  leverage  at  the  national  level  was  vir- 
tually  unchanged  from  1985,  the  lower  ROE 
simply  reflects  the  lower  ROA  for  all U.S.  banks. 
During  1986  Fifth  District  banks  lowered  their 
ratio  of retained  earnings  to  average  assets  from  .67 
percent  to  .66 percent.  Along  with  the  higher  ROA, 
this  enabled  banks  to  increase  dividends  from  .31 
percent  to  .34  percent  relative  to  average  assets 
(Table  I). Banks  at the  national  level  maintained  cash 
dividends  at .33 percent  of average  assets  and allowed 
retained  earnings  to  decline  to  .31  percent. 
3  For  a  definition  and  discussion  of  leverage,  see  page  3’2. 
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ROA  or ROE?  The  two  standard  measures  of bank 
profitability  are  return  on  assets  (ROA)  and  return  on 
equity  (ROE).*  ROA  is  defined  as  net  income  as  a 
percent  of  average  assets  held  during  a year,  that  is, 
ROA  = 
Net  Income  . 
Average  Assets 
Average  assets  is the  average  book  value  of assets  held 
at  the  beginning  and  at the  end  of the  year.  It  is used 
because  income  is  earned  throughout  the  year  and 
assets  are  likely  to  vary  during  the  year.  ROE  is 
defined  as  net  income  as  a percent  of  average  book 
value  of  equity  outstanding  during  a year,  or 
ROE  _  Net  Income  . 
-  Average  Equity 
Which  is the  more  useful  profitability  measure?  As will 
be  seen,  neither  sums  up  everything. 
ROA  is  the  more  straightforward  measure  of prof- 
itability  because  it shows  profits  as a yield  on  all a bank’s 
sources  of value.  ROA  is  often  used  to  compare  the 
performance  of  one  bank  with  another  or  with  the 
average  of all banks.  Despite  its  popularity,  there  are 
pitfalls  in using  ROA  to  compare  banks  in  a particular 
year. 
For  example,  a high  ROA  could  be  the  result  of effi- 
cient  operations  or a low cost  deposit  base.  Importantly, 
it  could  also  be  the  result  of lending  at  high  rates  to 
risky  borrowers.  It  is even  possible  that  a small  bank 
with  low  overhead  expenses  and  access  to  low  cost 
deposits  might  earn  a  high  ROA  by  placing  a  high 
percentage  of its  funds  in  securities  rather  than  loans. 
While  gross  returns  may  be  lower  on  securities  than 
on  loans,  so  also  may  be  losses  and  administrative 
expenses. 
A low  ROA  could  stem  from  heavy  reliance  on pur- 
chased  funds  or  relatively  high  cost  time  deposits.  It 
could  also come  from  conservative  lending  policies  that 
yield  relatively  low  rates  in the  current  year  but  fewer 
loan  and  lease  loss  provisions  in  future  years. 
ROA  reflects  the  return  to  both  depositors  and 
owners.  In  contrast,  ROE  tells  how  effectively  a bank’s 
assets  are being  used  to produce  income  for its owners. 
As  a guide  to  the  profitability  of a bank  as  an  invest- 
ment,  then,  ROE  appears  to be more  useful  than  ROA. 
Unfortunately,  ROE  also  has  pitfalls  when  used  to 
compare  banks.  The  definitions  of  ROA  and  ROE 
given  above  imply  the  following  relationship: 
ROE  =  ROA  x  Average  Assets/Average  Equity 
l  Higgins  (1984,  chap.  2) discusses  in more  detail the  in- 
herent  difficulties  of various  profitability  measures. 
where  the  ratio  of assets  to equity  measures  the kwage 
of a bank.  The  relationship  implies  two  things.  First, 
ROE  will  be  subject  to  the  same  disadvantages  as 
ROA.  Second,  differences  in  leverage  between  banks 
will  affect  their  relative  ROES. 
Leverage  measures  how  much  of a bank’s  assets  is 
financed  by  persons  other  than  the  equity  owners. 
Because  higher  leverage  means  relatively  more  fiied 
claims  on  a bank’s  assets  by  depositors,  higher  leverage 
means  higher  @anhal  risk  to  the  owners.  In  other 
words,  leverage  magnifies  the effect  on  ROE  of changes 
in  ROA.  For  example,  if two  banks  have  the  same 
positive  ROA,  the  more  leveraged  will have  the  higher 
ROE.  Similarly,  losses  will cause  ROE  to fall more  for 
highly  leveraged  banks. 
Further,  large banks  tend  to be  more  highly  leveraged 
than  small banks.  It does  not  follow,  however,  that  large 
banks  are  necessarily  more  risky  than  small  banks. 
While  higher  leverage  implies  higher  financial  risk,  it 
says  nothing  about  btitles~  &  arising  from  banks’  loan, 
investment,  and  funding  decisions.  In  fact,  a  large 
bank’s  financial  risk  from  leverage  could  be  more  than 
offset  by  lower  business  risk  from  a more  diversified 
loan  and  investment  portfolio.  Unfortunately,  neither 
ROA  nor  ROE  can  on  its  own  disentangle  the  risk 
components. 
There  are fewer  problems  with  using  ROA  and  ROE 
to  compare  bank  performance  over  time.  A  group  of 
banks  is subject  to  common  influences  over  time,  for 
example,  changes  in  interest  rates  and  in  the  fortunes 
of  regional  economies.  Changes  in  ROA  and  ROE 
would  express  how  a  bank  or  group  of  banks  re- 
sponded  to the  common  influences.  In  addition,  since 
banks  following  risky  loan  policies  might  also  have 
higher  loan  losses  over  time,  differences  in  risk  be- 
tween  banks  are  more  likely  to  cancel  out.  That  is,  a 
bank  following  a high  risk  strategy  may  report  higher 
net  income  (and  ROA)  now,  but  may  have  to set  aside 
higher  provision  for  loan  and  lease  losses  (and  report 
lower  net  income  and  ROA)  in  later  periods. 
Still,  there  are difhculties  in making  comparisons  over 
time.  For  example,  ROA  and  ROE  could  be  driven 
up or down  by gains  or losses  from  the  sale of securities. 
In  this  case,  ROA  and  ROE  changes  are  more  the 
result  of interest  movements  and  timing  of securities 
sales than  of credit  or operational  factors  under  the  con- 
trol  of management.  For  this  reason,  some  analysts  ex- 
clude  securities  gains  and  losses  when  calculating  ROA 
and  ROE  (see  Text,  Table  II). 
Book  y,lue  Accounting  A  significant  problem  with 
ROA,  ROE,  and  other  performance  measures  is that 
they  are  calculated  from  book  values  of  assets, 
liabilities,  and  equity.  Book  values  fail  to  account  for 
changes  in  the  value  of  assets,  liabilities,  and  equity 
occurring  between  their  placement  on the  books  of the 
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or charge-off.  The  failure  of book  values  to reflect  such 
changes  in  worth  is  a serious  problem  when  interest 
rates  fluctuate  and  when  the  ability  of  borrowers  to 
repay  debts  comes  into  question. 
The  data  used  in  the  preparation  of this  article  and 
in most  investigations  of bank  performance  come  from 
the  Consolidated  Reports  of  Condition  and  Income 
(known  as call  reports)  collected  from  banks  by  their 
principal  regulators.  The  reports  include  a  balance 
sheet,  an  income  statement,  and  some  supporting 
documents,  all  of which  must  be  furnished  quarterly 
by  every  insured  bank.  Call  reports  require  banks  to 
report  book  values  of  assets  and  liabilities,  although 
market  values  of  securities  are  also  reported. 
The  book  value  of a loan,  for example,  is the  amount 
of money  originally  advanced  or paid  for the  loan  minus 
principal  repayment  and  minus  losses  that  have  been 
charged  off.  In  the  case  of  securities  and  loans  pur- 
chased  by  the  bank  at other  than  par value,  book  value 
is the  price  paid  for the  security  or loan  plus  an amount 
to  account  for the  amortization  of premium  or the  ac- 
cretion  of discount.  Book  value,  then,  is the  historic 
value  of  an  asset  or  liability. 
If banks  used  market  value  accounting,  they  would 
value  their  assets  and  liabilities  at  the  price,  or  best 
estimate  of  the  price,  they  would  trade  for  in  the 
market.  Estimates  of market  value  can  be very  accurate 
if there  is a developed  market  for  an  asset.  If there  is 
no  active  or  developed  market  for  a particular  asset, 
however,  estimates  of  market  value  can  be  difficult. 
Still,  even  rough  estimates  of  market  value  would 
probably  provide  more  useful  information  than  book 
values.  *  l 
The  biases  inherent  in  book  value  accounting  may 
show up in different  ways.  For  example,  suppose  a bank 
buys  a security  with  a yield  of  10.5  percent.  If market 
interest  rates  fall to,  say,  9.5  percent,  the  market  price 
of the  security  rises.  Under  market  value  accounting, 
reported  net  income  in  the  current  period  would  rise 
by  the  amount  of the  price  increase,  but  the  return  on 
the  security  in  the  current  and  subsequent  periods 
would  decrease  to  the  market  level  of 9.5  percent.  In 
contrast,  under  book  value  accounting  the  value  of the 
security  is not  adjusted,  so the  income  from  the  security 
continues  at  the  now  above-market  rate  of  10.5  per- 
cent.  Unless  the  bank  sells  the  security  and  recognizes 
the  capital  gains,  reported  income  in  subsequent 
periods  will be  biased  upwards  from  true  economic  in- 
come.  Similarly,  if interest  rates  rise  the  bank  avoids 
* *  For  a discussion  of the  feasibility  of market  value account- 
ing  as  a  substitute  for  book  value  accounting,  see  Lcreah 
(1986).  For  arguments  in favor  of market  value  accounting, 
see  Benston  et  al.  (1986,  chap.  8). 
having  to  book  the  loss,  but  subsequent  reported 
returns  from  the  security  will  be  biased  downward 
until  the  security  is  sold. 
A  more  serious  example  of  disadvantages  of  book 
value  accounting  arises  with  problem  loans.  Under  cur- 
rent  practices  a problem  loan  may  be  carried  at book 
value  so  long  as  it  is  expected  to  eventually  be  paid 
back  in  full.  In  practice,  a banker  might  not  set  aside 
reserves  on  a problem  loan  unless  pressured  to  do  so 
by regulators.  This  leads  to curious  effects  on  reported 
ROA  and  ROE.  By failing  to adjust  the  reported  value 
of a loan for anticipated  losses,  the  bank  manager  avoids 
having  to  reduce  current  reported  net  income  by  the 
amount  of the provision  for loan  and  lease  losses.  Since 
the  loan  is a problem  loan,  however,  current  income 
from  the  loan  is probably  below  its contracted  amount. 
The  result  is an  ROA  biased  downward  from  market 
levels.  So,  in  this  case  the  price  of  avoiding  reduced 
current  income  from  setting  aside  loss reserves  is lower 
ROA  in  subsequent  periods.  Once  a  loan  is  written 
down  to its estimated  market  value,  return  on  the  loan 
goes  back  to  market  levels. 
A final  problem  with  using  book  values  in  measur- 
ing performance  arises  because  the  value  of equity  out- 
standing  is reported  at book  value  rather  than  market 
value.  Thus,  ROE  does  not  express  profitability  as yield 
realized  in the  market  by investors.  Rather,  book  ROES 
may  be biased  upward  or downward  from  actual  market 
yields  depending  on  whether  the  shares  of  the  bank 
would  sell  below  or above  their  book  values.  In  addi- 
tion,  leverage  measures  based  on book  values  may  give 
a  distorted  picture  of a  bank’s  true  capital  structure. 
There  are  two  problems  with  using  market  values 
of  equity  to  compute  ROE  and  leverage,  however. 
First,  because  the  shares  of  most  banks  are  not  ac- 
tively  traded,  there  are  few  market  transactions  from 
which  values  could  be  inferred.  Second,  most  actively 
traded  shares  are  those  of  bank  holding  companies 
rather  than  banks,  so  the  market  value  of the  equity 
might  reflect  the  value  of several  subsidiary  banks  as 
well  as  nonbank  subsidiaries.  Thus,  even  if  one 
wished  to use  market  value  of equity  to compute  ROE 
and  leverage,  the  required  information  might  not  be 
readily  available  for  all  banks. 
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Chart  3 
RETURN  ON  EQUITY* 
Fifth  District  Banks 
Small  Banks 
1979  1981  1983 
*  Net  income  divided  by  average  equity. 
1985 
Interest  Margin 
Net  interest  margin,  the  difference  between  in- 
terest  income  and  interest  expense  as a percent  of 
average  assets,  fell  6 percent  at Fifth  District  banks 
during  1986  (Table  I). The  decline  brought  net  in- 
terest  margin  to  a historically  low  level.  At  all U.S. 
banks,  net  interest  margin  fell  by  4 percent.  Even 
with  the  greater  decline,  Fifth  District  banks  enjoyed 
a  13  percent  higher  net  interest  margin  than  their 
U.S.  counterparts.  Net  interest  margin  declined  for 
all size classes  of Fifth  District  banks,  but  the  decline 
was  greatest  at  medium-sized  banks. 
Falling  interest  rates  during  1986  pushed  down 
earnings  on assets.  Table  III shows  that earnings  from 
loans  and  leases  declined  more  than  earnings  from 
securities.  The  ratio  of short-term  maturity  loans  and 
leases  to all Fifth  District  loans  and leases  was greater 
than  the  ratio  of short-term  securities  to all securities, 
so the  loan  and  lease  portfolio  of Fifth  District  banks 
was more  rate-sensitive  than  the  securities  portfolio. 
The  decline  in market  rates  therefore  led to a greate:r 
decline  in return  on  loans  and  leases  than  in return 
on  securities. 
Fifth  District  banks’  gross  interest  expense  ratio 
(interest  expense  as a percentage  of average  assets) 
declined  by  73 basis points  from  1985  to  1986.  This 
decline,  like  that  in  interest  income,  was  largely 
caused  by falling interest  rates.  Table  IV shows  lower 
costs  of  all major  categories  of  liabilities. 
Noninterest  Revenue  and  Expense 
On  average,  Fifth  District  banks  experienced  no 
change  in noninterest  income  as a percent  of average 
assets  from  1985  to  1986.  Service  charge  and 
leasing  income  fell,  while  other  noninterest  income 
grew  by  an  offsetting  amount.4  At  the  same  time, 
District  banks  were  able  to  decrease  noninterest 
expenses  relative  to average  assets  by  11 basis points 
during  the year.  The  major  part  of this decrease  came 
from  a decline  in  salaries  expense.  While  employ- 
ment  by  Fifth  District  banks  actually  increased  by 
3  percent  in  1986,  the  number  of  employees  per 
million  dollars  of  assets  fell  by  11 percent. 
The  average  results  for  Fifth  District  banks  con- 
ceal  differences  between  size  classes.  Small  banks’ 
decline  in  service  charges  and  other  noninterest 
income  was  more  than  offset  by  lower  salaries  and 
other  noninterest  expense.  Medium  banks’ fall in ser- 
vice  charge  income  was  swamped  by  a decrease  in 
salaries and bank  premises  expense.  Large  banks  had 
stable  noninterest  income  categories  but  a  decline 
in  salaries  expense. 
4 Other  noninterest  income  includes  such  items  as income  from 
credit  card  fees,  fiduciary  activities,  mortgage  loan servicing  fees, 
and  safe  deposit  box  rentals.  Other  noninterest  expense  includes 
such  items  as insurance  premiums,  legal  fees,  advertising,  and 
charges  resulting  from  litigation  or  other  claims. 
Table  III 
AVERAGE  RATES OF  RETURN  ON  SELECTED  INTEREST-EARNING  ASSETS 
FIFTH  DISTRICT  COMMERCIAL  BANKS,  1979-86 
Item  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984’  1985*  19862 
Total  interest-earning  assets  10.09  11.28  13.18  12.68  11.11  11.77  11.06  9.78 
Total  loans  and leases  11.25  12.50  14.48  14.14  12.38  12.59  11.92  10.63 
Net  loans  and leases’  11.37  12.63  14.64  14.30  12.53  12.74  12.08  10.77 
Total  securities  6.43  7.15  8.57  9.27  9.20  9.68  9.01  8.30 
L  Net  loans  and  leases  are:  total  loans  net  of  allowance  for  loan  losses  for  1979-83;  total  loans  and  leases  net  of  the  sum  of  allowance 
for  loan  and  lease  losses  and  allocated  transfer  risk  reserve  for  1984-86. 
2  Total  and  net  loans  and  leases  here  include  leases  while  in  other  columns  they  do  not. 
34  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JULY/AUGUST  1987 Table  IV 
AVERAGE COST OF FUNDS  FOR SELECTED  LIABILITIES 
FIFTH  DISTRICT  COMMERCIAL  BANKS,  1979-86 
Item  1979  1980 
Interest-bearing  deposit  accounts  7.15  8.68 
Large  certificates  of  deposit  9.96  11.33 
Deposits  in  foreign  offices  10.28  13.17 
Other  deposits  6.16  7.54 
Subordinated  notes  and debentures  8.19  8.20 
Fed  funds  11.94  13.34 
Other  6.98  8.65 
Total  7.60  9.13 
Loan  and  Lease  Loss  Provision5 
Fifth  District  banks  set  aside  income  equivalent 
to  .40 percent  of average  assets  as provision  for loan 
and  lease  losses,  a decrease  from  the  .46 percent  set 
aside  in  1985.  As  in  previous  years,  1986  Fifth 
District  provision  was  well  below  that  of banks  na- 
tionwide.  On  average,  all U.S.  banks  set  aside  in- 
come  equivalent  to  .76 percent  of average  assets  for 
provision  in  1986  compared  with  .66  percent  in 
1985. 
Chart  4  shows  that  in the  Fifth  District  changes 
in loan  and  lease  loss  provision  varied  considerably 
with  size  of  bank.  Large  banks  were  able  to  lower 
their  provision  during  1986  to  .42 percent  of average 
assets.  Medium  banks’  provision  was unchanged  be- 
tween  1985  and  1986  at  .30  percent  of  average 
assets,  while  small  banks  increased  their  provision 
to  .39  percent  of  average  assets. 
The  ratio  of  nonperforming  loans  and  leases6  to 
total loans and leases,  and the  ratio of loans and leases 
charged  off  (net  of  recoveries)  to  the  total  of  loans 
and  leases,  are measures  of the  quality  of past  credit 
decisions.  Historically  Fifth  District  banks  have  had 
much  lower  levels  of  these  ratios  than  the  average 
for  all U.S.  banks, 
.  5  Loan  and  lease  loss  provision  is  the  income  statement  flow 
that  adds  to the  balance  sheet  stock  known  as allowance  for loan 
and  lease  losses.  Provision  for allocated  transfer  risk  is included 
in provision  for loan  and  lease  losses,  and  allocated  transfer  risk 
reserve  is  included  in  allowance  for  loan  and  lease  losses 
(except  when  computing  capital  ratios). 
6  A nonperforming  loan  or lease  is defined  in this  article  as one 
that  has  not  been  charged  off  but  is 90  days  or  more  past  due 
or  is  not  accruing  interest.  Net  charge-offs  are  loan  and  lease 
losses,  net  of loans  and  leases  recovered,  actually  charged  against 
the  allowance  for  loan  and  lease  losses.  In  other  words,  they 
are  flows  subtracted  from  the  allowance. 
1981  1982 
10.63  9.91 
14.35  12.05 
15.18  12.79 
9.23  9.12 
8.11  8.34 
15.54  11.21 
13.49  11.29 
11.23  10.10 
1983  1984  1985  1986 
8.19  8.72  7.89  6.77 
7.62  9.47  7.91  7.07 
7.73  9.19  7.92  6.40 
8.34  8.55  7.97  6.74 
8.32  8.03  9.64  8.48 
8.52  9.58  7.67  6.92 
8.75  9.18  6.73  5.19 
8.24  8.84  7.90  6.76 
In  the  Fifth  District,  nonperforming  loans  and 
leases  were  1.1 percent  of total  loans  and  leases  at 
the  end  of  1986,  unchanged  from  the  previous  year. 
Net  charge-offs  increased  over  the  period  from  .41 
percent  of  total  loans  and  leases  to  .47  percent. 
District  banks  apparently  set  aside  sufficient  provi- 
sion to keep  allowance  at about  the  same  level relative 
to  total  loans  and  leases  in  1986  as it  had  been  in 
1985. 
For  all banks  in the  nation,  2.8  percent  of  loans 
and leases  were  nonperforming,  up from  2.7 percent 
in  1985.  Charge-offs  rose  from  .81  percent  of loans 
and  leases  in  1985  to  .93  percent  in  1986.  In addi- 
tion,  banks  at the  national  level  increased  allowance 
as  a percentage  of  total  loans  and  leases. 
Chart  4 
LOAN  AND  LEASE  LOSS  PROVISIONS 
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Percent  Fifth  District Banks 
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In  1986  the  average  Fifth  District  bank’s  capital 
ratio  fell  slightly  from  its  198.5  level  (Table  V). 
Looking  at  each  size  class  shows,  however,  that 
only  large  banks’  capital  ratio  fell  while  small-  and 
medium-sized  banks  increased  capital  rapidly. 
Specifically,  large banks’ primary  capital to assets  ratio 
declined  from  7.04  percent  at year-end  1985  to 6.91 
percent  at  the  end  of  1986.  Even  with  the  decline 
the  capital  ratio  of large  Fifth  District  banks  is well 
above  what  it  was  at  the  end  of  1984. 
At the  national  level  banks  increased  their  capital 
ratios  on  average.  Increases  took  place  in large-  and 
medium-sized  banks’  ratios,  while  for  small  banks 
capital  ratios  declined  slightly.  Because  U.S.  banks 
have  been  increasing  capital  ratios  on average  for the 
last  three  years,  by  1986  the  national  average  sur- 
passed  that  for  Fifth  District  banks.  Still,  small-  and 
medium-sized  Fifth  District  banks  maintained  sig- 
nificantly  higher  capital  ratios  on  average  than  their 
peers  at  the  national  level. 
The  components  of  large  Fifth  District  banks’ 
primary  capital  that  fell  (relative  to  assets)  were 
common  stock,  capital  surplus,  and  allowance  for 
loan  and  lease  losses.  These  declines  were  offset  to 
some  extent  by  increases  in  undivided  profits  and 
mandatory  convertible  debt.  Small and medium  Fifth 
District  banks  improved  their  capital  ratios  by 
adding  to  common  stock,  surplus,  undivided  profits, 
and  allowances  for loan  and lease  losses.  For  all U.S. 
banks,  common  stock  declined  relative  to  assets 
while  surplus,  undivided  profits,  allowance  for  loan 
and  lease  losses,  and  perpetual  preferred  stock 
increased. 
Table  V 
CAPITAL  RATIOS 
FIFTH  DISTRICT  AND  ALL  U.S.  COMMERCIAL  BANKS 
Fifth  District 
Primary  ratio 
Total  ratio 
All  U.S.  banks 
Primary  ratio 
Total  ratio 
Fifth  District 
Primary  ratio 
Total  ratio 
All  U.S.  banks 
Primary  ratio 
Total  ratio 
Fifth  District 
Primary  ratio 
Total  ratio 
All  U.S.  banks 
Primary  ratio 
Total  ratio 
1986 
Small  Medium 
10.23  8.75 





7.49  * 
7.75 
L 
9.26  8.01 
9.30  8.15 
1985 
7.03  7.52 
7.51  7.88 
Small  Medium 
9.91  8.35 
9.96  8.40 
Large  Total 
7.04  7.56 
7.34  7.79 
9.31  7.92 
9.37  8.10 
1984 
6.84  7.41 
7.26  7.73 
Small  Medium 
9.60  8.35 
9.63  8.41 
Large  Total 
6.64  7.28 
6.92  7.49 
9.24  7.94  6.35  7.11 
9.31  8.15  6.66  7.36 
Note:  Primary  capital  here  is common  stock,  perpetual  preferred 
stock,  surplus,  undivided  profits,  capital  reserves,  mandatory 
convertible  instruments,allowance  for  loan  and  lease  losses, 
and  minority  interest  In  consolidated  subsidaries,  less  in- 
tangible  assets.  Total  capital  includes  primary  capital  plus 
limited  life  preferred  stock  and  those  subordinated  notes  and 
debentures  not  eligible  for  primary  capital.  Primary  capital  and 
total  capital  are  divided  by  quarterly  average  assets  plus 
allowance  for  loan  and  lease  losses  less  intangible  assets  to 
produce  primary  ratio  and  total  ratio.  The  measures  used  here 
correspond  closely  but  not  exactly  to  the  different  measures 
used  by  the  federal  bank  regulatory  agencies. 
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INCOME  AND  EXPENSE  AS A PERCENT  OF AVERAGE ASSETS 
ALL  U.S.  COMMERCIAL  BANKS,  1979-86’ 
Item  1979 
Gross  interest  revenue 
Gross  interest  expense 
Net  interest  margin 
Noninterest  income 
Loan  and lease  loss  provision 
Securities  gain9 
Noninterest  expense 
Income  before  tax 
Taxes 
OtherJ 
Return  on  assets* 
Cash  dividends  declared 
Net  retained  earnings 
Return  on  equity5 
Average  assets  ($  billions) 
8.62  9.87  11.81  11.19 
5.50  6.78  8.75  8.02 
3.12  3.09  3.07  3.17 
0.78  0.89  0.99  1.05 
0.24  0.25  0.26  0.39 
2.54  2.63  2.76  2.91 
1.12  1.10  1.04  0.91 
0.28  0.28  0.24  0.17 
-0.04  -0.03  -0.04  -  0.03 
0.80  0.79  0.76  0.71 
0.28  0.29  0.30  0.31 
0.52  0.50  0.46  0.40 
13.90  13.70  13.20  12.20 
1,593  1,768  1,940  2,100 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
9.50  10.11 
6.36  6.95 
3.15  3.16 
1.12  1.27 
0.47  0.55 
-0.01 
2.95  3.05 
0.84  0.82 
0.18  0.19 
0.00  0.01 
0.67  0.64 
0.33  0.31 
0.34  0.33 
11.24  10.63 
2,253  2,398 
1985  1986 
9.23  8.15 
5.98  5.02 
3.25  3.13 
1.39  1.46 
0.66  0.76 
0.06  0.13 
3.15  3.17 
0.89  0.81 
0.21  0.19 
0.01  0.01 
0.70  0.63 
0.33  0.33 
0.37  0.31 
11.33  10.22 
2,604  2,799 
Note:  Discrepancies  due  to  rounding  error. 
1  Average  assets  are  based  on  fully  consolidated  volumes  outstanding  at  the  beginning  and  at  the  end  of  the  year. 
2  Banks  were  required  to  report  securities  gains  or  losses  above  the  tax  line  on  their  income  statements  for  the  first  time  in  1984. 
J  Includes  securities  and  extraordinary  gains  or  losses  after  taxes,  for  1979-83  data,  and  extraordinary  items  and  other  adjustments  after 
taxes  for  1984-86  data. 
4  Return  on  assets  is  net  income  divided  by  average  assets. 
5  Return  on  equity  is  net  income  divided  by  average  equity.  Average  equity  is  based  on  fully  consolidated  volumes  outstanding  at  the 
beginning  and  at  the  end  of  the  year. 
Sources:  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  1981, 1984  (1979-83  data);  Consolidated  Reports  of  Condition  and  Income  (1984-86  data). 
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